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THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE:  
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE  
INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED? 
ALLISON B. JONES 
INTRODUCTION 
The principle behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 seems simple 
enough: of all the federal courts, only the United States Supreme 
Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.2 Yet from 
this innocuous principle rooted in our country’s federalist 
foundations, a seemingly impermeable cover of jurisprudential kudzu 
has grown. A primary source of the doctrine’s expansion and the 
consequent confusion has been the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry 
introduced by District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.3 
Supreme Court opacity concerning what it means to be inextricably 
intertwined4 has resulted in significant incongruity in the lower 
federal courts,5 which is all the more troubling in light of the 
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 1. The doctrine is named for the two cases that created it: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
263 U.S. 413 (1923), discussed infra at Part I.A, and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), discussed infra at Part I.B. 
 2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (conferring on the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction 
over final judgments of the highest courts of the states); cf., e.g., id. § 1331 (giving federal district 
courts original jurisdiction over federal question suits); id. § 1332 (giving federal district courts 
original jurisdiction over diversity suits). 
 3. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483–84 n.16 (1983). 
 4. See Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“Since Feldman, the Supreme Court has provided us with little guidance in determining which 
claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior state court judgment and which are not.”); 
Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993) (“There is, unfortunately, no bright line that 
separates a federal claim that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment from a 
claim that is not so intertwined.”); Razatos v. Colo. Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433 (10th 
Cir. 1984) (“[T]his [inextricably intertwined] language by itself does not provide district courts 
with a bright line rule . . . .”). 
 5. See infra Part III. 
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frequency with which these courts employ the concept, often to deny 
federal jurisdiction.6 
Attention recently returned to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine via 
the Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp.7 Observing that lower courts had greatly expanded the 
doctrine, the Court scaled back Rooker-Feldman and explicitly 
clarified many aspects of the doctrine that had troubled federal 
courts, except for what it means to be inextricably intertwined.8 This 
Note first presents an account of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its 
recent clarification;9 it then explores the different approaches taken to 
interpreting the “inextricably intertwined” concept;10 and lastly it 
speculates about what Exxon Mobil might mean for the future of the 
“inextricably intertwined” inquiry.11 
I.  THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE 
At its most basic, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after the 
two cases from which it sprung,12 is the principle that lower federal 
courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court judgments.13 It is 
based on the congressional grant, in 28 U.S.C. § 1257,14 of appellate 
 
 6. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999) (observing the “notable frequency” with which federal 
courts invoke Rooker-Feldman to find that they lack jurisdiction). 
 7. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Parts I–II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), discussed infra at Part I.A; D.C. 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), discussed infra at Part I.B. 
 13. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005) (“Rooker 
and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which [the Supreme] Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction over state-court judgments precludes a United States district court from exercising 
subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate . . . .” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 14. The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) provides: 
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a 
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari 
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or 
where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its 
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where 
any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the 
Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority 
exercised under, the United States. 
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “highest court of a State” includes the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 
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jurisdiction over state court judgments to the United States Supreme 
Court and the grant of original jurisdiction over certain suits to 
United States district courts.15 Read together, these statutes indicate 
that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court 
judgments is exclusive and the jurisdiction16 of the federal district 
courts is purely original.17 In addition to these statutory bases, 
prudential considerations such as judicial federalism18 and system 
consistency19 also underlie the doctrine. Because these limits are 
statutory and prudential rather than constitutional, Congress can and 
has made exceptions to the doctrine, most notably in granting district 
courts jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petitions of state 
prisoners.20 
Although the Supreme Court has never found a case to be 
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine aside from the two for which 
it is named,21 lower federal courts regularly employ an expansive 
version of the doctrine to dismiss federal actions.22 Understanding the 
 
Id. 
 15. E.g., id. § 1330 (suits against foreign states); id. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); 
id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). 
 16. As a jurisdictional bar, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may be raised at any time, by 
either party or sua sponte by the court. Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996). Like 
other limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, it cannot be waived. 18 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][b], at 133-26 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 17. See Benjamin Smith, Case Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis 
of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627, 
629 (1987) (calling the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “the product of two negative inferences”). 
 18. See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman 
Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1085, 1089–1108 (1999) (describing Rooker-
Feldman as one of the doctrines created to address the “aggregation of issues arising from the 
existence of two sets of American courts”). 
 19. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res 
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1350 (1980) (“[I]f trial courts could 
readily annul the judgment of each other on the merits, the prerequisite of finality in the judicial 
system would be destroyed. This is the system-consistency basis of Rooker.”). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) gives district courts jurisdiction over state prisoner habeas 
petitions. Although exceptions are rare, other statutory exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine include bankruptcy jurisdiction and 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2000), which concerns 
jurisdiction to invalidate the results of custody proceedings regarding an Indian child. See Doe v. 
Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting these exceptions to the doctrine). 
 21. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) 
(remarking that the Court has applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only twice: first in Rooker 
and then sixty years later in Feldman). 
 22. See Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1999) (“The doctrine has emerged as perhaps the primary 
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cases that initially gave rise to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 
essential to recognizing its intended scope. 
A. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. 
The plaintiffs in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.23 asked that the 
federal court declare null and void the judgment of an Indiana circuit 
court, which had been affirmed by the state’s supreme court; they also 
sought “to obtain other relief dependent on that outcome.”24 The 
Rookers were unhappy with the state court decision in favor of 
Fidelity, and they believed that errors in the state court’s judgment 
were to blame. After the judgment, they filed suit in federal district 
court, claiming that the state court decision violated the Contracts 
Clause, due process, and equal protection in that it gave effect to a 
supposedly unconstitutional state statute and did not give effect to a 
prior decision by the Indiana Supreme Court, which was alleged to 
have become “the law of the case.”25 
The district court dismissed the case, finding it not to be within 
its jurisdiction as defined by Congress, and the United States 
Supreme Court agreed.26 After first noting that the state court 
properly had jurisdiction over the case and that the plaintiffs had a 
full hearing there, the Court concluded: 
If the constitutional questions stated in the bill [the federal suit] 
actually arose in the cause [the state suit], it was the province and 
duty of the state courts to decide them; and their decision, whether 
right or wrong, was an exercise of jurisdiction. If the decision was 
wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open 
to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate 
proceeding.27 
 
docket-clearing workhorse for the federal courts . . . .”). Commentators have taken their cue 
from the Supreme Court, leaving the Rooker-Feldman doctrine largely overlooked in the 
scholarly literature. This was the case, at least, until the Notre Dame Law Review’s 1999 
publication of a thoughtful symposium on the doctrine. See Symposium, The Rooker-Feldman 
Doctrine, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081 (1999). 
 23. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
 24. Id. at 414. 
 25. Id. at 415. 
 26. Id. (“[T]he suit is so plainly not within the District Court’s jurisdiction as defined by 
Congress that the motion to affirm must be sustained.”). 
 27. Id. 
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The Court then emphasized that lower federal courts are not the 
“appropriate appellate proceeding” in which to correct state court 
errors.28 No federal court other than the Supreme Court had been 
given authority by Congress to reverse or modify state court 
judgments, the Court held; to do so would be an exercise of appellate 
jurisdiction, and “[t]he jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is 
strictly original.”29 
Rooker’s holding, that federal district courts are not the correct 
place for parties to appeal issues decided against them in state court, 
is a narrow and uncontroversial principle.30 After Rooker, lower 
federal courts applied this principle with regularity, usually to bar 
actions with facts closely analogous to those of Rooker itself.31 The 
Supreme Court cited Rooker only once, in passing,32 in the sixty years 
between the Rooker decision and its companion case, District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.33 
B. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman 
Feldman34 brought suit in federal court against the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals35 after that court denied his request for a 
 
 28. Id. at 415–16. 
 29. Id. at 416. 
 30. Bandes, supra note 22, at 1177. 
 31. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lecon Props., Inc., 457 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) 
(district court had no jurisdiction over § 1983 action alleging violation of constitutional rights by 
the state supreme court); Ash v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1966) (district court 
could not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court eminent domain proceedings); 
Williams v. Tooke, 108 F.2d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1940) (district court had no jurisdiction to reverse 
or modify the state court judgment); Daniel B. Frazier Co. v. Long Beach Twp., 77 F.2d 764, 765 
(3d Cir. 1935) (per curiam) (district court did not have jurisdiction over issues decided adversely 
to plaintiff by highest court of the state); Reese v. Louisville Trust Co., 58 F.2d 638, 638 (6th Cir. 
1932) (per curiam) (district court did not have jurisdiction to set aside state court judgment even 
though federal constitutional questions were involved); Fryberger v. Parker, 28 F.2d 493, 496–97 
(8th Cir. 1928), vacated per stipulation of the parties, 31 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1928) (district court 
had no jurisdiction over suit to enjoin enforcement of a state court judgment on due process 
grounds). For a more thorough synopsis of the application of the Rooker principle by lower 
courts in the interim between Rooker and Feldman, see Gary Thompson, Note, The Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 859, 863–71 (1990). 
 32. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 283 (1946) (citing 
Rooker in reference to the finality of prior judgments). 
 33. 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
 34. Although not technically consolidated, Feldman’s case was reviewed simultaneously 
with a similar suit brought by plaintiff Hickey because the allegations and requested relief in 
both were “virtually identical.” Id. at 472–73. 
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waiver of its bar admission rule requiring all applicants to have 
graduated from a law school accredited by the American Bar 
Association.36 Taking an alternative path to his legal career, as 
provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, Feldman had studied 
with a practicing attorney, audited classes, and served as a law clerk 
instead of attending law school.37 After passing the state bar exam, he 
was admitted to the Virginia Bar and later to the Maryland Bar, after 
Maryland waived its requirement that all applicants must be 
graduates of an ABA-approved law school.38 
After the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied 
Feldman’s petition for waiver, he brought an action against the court, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.39 Feldman’s complaint 
alleged both that the court’s action in denying his petition violated 
due process and equal protection, and that the bar admission rule 
itself violated due process and equal protection.40 The federal district 
court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,41 
but the circuit court reversed this decision on appeal. Although the 
circuit court agreed that district courts do not have the authority to 
review “determinations by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
in judicial proceedings,” the court held that a denial of a request for 
waiver of a bar rule was not a judicial proceeding; therefore, the 
district court properly had jurisdiction.42 
After determining the denial of waiver to be a judicial 
proceeding, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that district courts lack 
jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases 
arising out of judicial proceedings, even if those challenges allege that 
the state court’s action was unconstitutional.43 Such review may only 
be had in the Supreme Court.44 Thus, to the extent that Feldman 
 
 35. As the highest court for the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals is treated as a state supreme court. 
 36. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 467–68. 
 37. Id. at 465. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 468–69. 
 40. Id. at 469 n.3. In addition to these Fifth Amendment claims, Feldman also alleged that 
the defendants violated the Sherman Act, but the federal Court of Appeals dismissed the 
antitrust claims as insubstantial, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari as to those claims. Id. 
at 474 n.11. 
 41. Id. at 470. 
 42. Id. at 474. 
 43. Id. at 486. 
 44. Id. at 482. 
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sought review of the denial of his petition for waiver, the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.45 However, the Court distinguished 
review of the state court’s application of the rule to a particular 
proceeding from review of the rule itself. Because state supreme 
courts act in a nonjudicial capacity in promulgating rules regulating 
the bar, challenges to the constitutionality of the rules themselves do 
not require a federal district court to review a state court judgment in 
a judicial proceeding.46 Therefore, to the extent that Feldman 
mounted a general challenge to the constitutionality of the rule, the 
district court had jurisdiction.47 
In denying the district court jurisdiction over Feldman’s 
challenge to the judgment of the state court, the Court held: 
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district 
court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a 
judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff’s application for 
admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence being 
called upon to review the state-court decision. This the district court 
may not do.48 
Unlike the Rookers, Feldman did not ask the federal district court to 
declare a state judgment null and void; in fact, he did not raise his 
constitutional challenges in the state court at all (aside from arguing 
that the rule was invalid).49 Nevertheless, finding that these claims 
were “inextricably intertwined” with the District of Columbia court’s 
ultimate decision to deny the waiver, the Court held that entertaining 
the constitutional challenges would require the district court to 
review a final judicial decision of a state court in a particular case, 
which was beyond the district court’s jurisdiction.50 
The inclusion of inextricably intertwined claims marked an 
expansion of the Rooker principle, and to understand the meaning of 
the phrase, it is important to examine more closely the context in 
which it arose. After determining Feldman’s federal suit to be an 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 485–86. 
 47. Id. at 486–87. The Court noted that in deciding that the district court had jurisdiction 
over the elements of the complaints that involved a general challenge to the constitutionality of 
the rule, it “expressly [did] not reach the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata 
forecloses litigation on these elements of the complaints.” Id. at 487–88. 
 48. Id. at 483–84 n.16. 
 49. Id. at 480. 
 50. Id. at 486–87. 
06__JONES.DOC 12/19/2006  5:11 PM 
650 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:643 
impermissible appeal from the highest state court to a federal district 
court, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that the correct 
court in which to bring such an appeal was the United States Supreme 
Court.51 Then, in a footnote, he observed the possibility that even that 
Court might lack jurisdiction over this action, due to Feldman’s 
failure to raise his constitutional claims in the state court.52 However, 
the fact that the Supreme Court might not have jurisdiction over the 
action did not indicate that a district court should exercise jurisdiction 
over the claims.53 Brennan seized the opportunity to correct this 
flawed reasoning, which was being used by the Fifth Circuit at the 
time.54 In a case with facts similar to those of Feldman, the Fifth 
Circuit had pointed out that, because the plaintiff did not raise her 
constitutional claims in the state court, the Supreme Court would not 
be able to review her constitutional claims.55 The circuit court 
reasoned that, in such a situation, a federal district court was not 
entertaining an impermissible appeal if it exercised jurisdiction over 
the case, both because it would not be infringing on the Supreme 
Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over state appeals and because the 
specific federal constitutional claims had not been raised in the state 
court proceeding.56 
Decrying this reasoning, the Court reaffirmed that “lower federal 
courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court 
decisions.”57 If the constitutional claims presented in the district court, 
although not raised in the state court, are inextricably intertwined 
with the state court’s decision, then the district court is “in essence 
being called upon to review” the state court judgment, which it may 
in no way do.58 Feldman’s constitutional claims alleging that the 
District of Columbia court, by denying his petition for waiver, 
violated due process and equal protection were so inextricably 
 
 51. Id. at 482. 
 52. Id. at 483 n.16. In Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969), the Court held that “[i]t 
was very early established that the Court will not decide federal constitutional issues raised here 
for the first time on review of state court decisions,” id. at 438. 
 53. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16. 
 54. The particular case the Court sought to correct was Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas, 
658 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 55. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296 
(1970)). 
 58. Id. at 483–84 n.16. 
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intertwined with the court’s decision to deny the waiver that his 
claimed injury essentially was the court’s decision itself. Feldman was 
in essence asking the district court to review the District of Columbia 
court’s judgment.59 By failing to raise his constitutional claims in state 
court, such a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the 
state court decision in any federal court, a result that the Court found 
“eminently defensible on policy grounds.”60 
Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” language thus broadened 
the reach of the Rooker principle to those plaintiffs who knew better 
than to ask that the district court declare the state judgment null and 
void, but who in essence sought just such relief under cloak of 
constitutional claims. As will be seen, however, Feldman has been 
used by the lower courts at times to greatly circumscribe the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, beyond Feldman’s unique 
circumstances.61 After Feldman, district courts were left wondering 
how to apply its new standards—how to differentiate between general 
and particular challenges, and especially, how to identify when a 
claim is inextricably intertwined with a challenge to a state court 
judgment.62 With so little exposition on the phrase63—the Court 
introduced it in a footnote without definition and only mentioned it 
one more time, to conclude that it applied to Feldman’s claims—the 
lower courts have been left to their own devices and have come to 
significantly different conclusions about this pivotal element of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.64 
C. Supreme Court Development of the Doctrine since Feldman 
After Feldman, the Court did not comment on the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine at any length65 until it decided Exxon Mobil Corp. 
 
 59. Id. at 486–87. 
 60. Id. at 484 n.16. 
 61. See infra Parts I.D, II.B, and III. 
 62. See Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From the Ground Up, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1136 (1999) (asserting that these distinctions have proven 
“impossibly difficult to understand, as is apparent from the widespread confusion in the lower 
courts”); Sherry, supra note 18, at 1108 (suggesting courts have had difficulty sorting out these 
differences). 
 63. See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1183 (“Unfortunately, nothing in Feldman explains the 
rationale for the [inextricably intertwined] language or gives any indication of its proper 
scope.”). 
 64. See infra Part III. 
 65. The Court cited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in only six cases between Feldman and 
Exxon Mobil. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002) 
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v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.66 in March 2005. Although the Court 
did not find that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to any suits it 
considered during this time, three cases in which the Court mentions 
Rooker-Feldman may be helpful for interpreting “inextricably 
intertwined” in its larger doctrinal context. In ASARCO Inc. v. 
Kadish,67 the United States, as intervener, suggested that the 
petitioners should sue in federal trial court to readjudicate the same 
issues that were determined in the state court proceeding instead of 
appealing to the Supreme Court, because their standing for the state 
suit did not meet federal standing requirements.68 The Court rejected 
this suggestion, saying that such a federal suit would in essence be an 
attempt to obtain direct review of the state supreme court’s decision 
in the district court, which would represent a “partial inroad on 
Rooker-Feldman’s construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1257.”69 
A few years earlier, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,70 a majority of 
the Court agreed that Texaco’s challenge to Texas procedures for 
enforcing judgments did not implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
Pennzoil had prevailed in the state court with an unprecedented jury 
 
(holding that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when a party seeks federal review of a state 
agency action); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (holding that Rooker-
Feldman does not bar the United States from bringing a federal action when it was not a party 
to and does not directly attack the state proceedings); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 
(1990) (citing Rooker and Feldman for the proposition that a district court “cannot entertain an 
original action alleging that a state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an 
unconstitutional state statute”); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622–23 (1989) (noting 
that if petitioners sued in federal district court instead of appealing to the Supreme Court, the 
federal action would be a “partial inroad on Rooker-Feldman’s construction of 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1257”); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rooker 
and Feldman for the proposition that it would be anomalous to allow courts to review 
judgments entered by courts of equal or greater authority); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 
U.S. 1, 6–10 (1987) (abstaining under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), instead of 
dismissing under Rooker-Feldman); id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (maintaining that the “so-
called Rooker-Feldman doctrine” does not apply to Texaco’s challenge to Texas procedures for 
enforcing judgments); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (asserting that Rooker-
Feldman does not apply because Texaco did not file its federal action to challenge the merits of 
the Texas suit); id. at 25–26 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (maintaining that Rooker-
Feldman should apply because Texaco’s claims necessarily call for review of its state appeal). 
 66. 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
 67. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). 
 68. Id. at 622. 
 69. Id. at 622–23. 
 70. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
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verdict,71 and Texas rules stipulated that unless the judgment debtor 
posted bond (which would have been around thirteen million dollars), 
the judgment creditor could place liens on the debtor’s property while 
the case was appealed.72 Texaco brought suit in federal court seeking 
a stay of judgment pending appeal, and the Court declined to dismiss 
the case under Rooker-Feldman,73 holding instead that the district 
court should abstain according to Younger v. Harris.74 The majority 
opinion’s assumption of jurisdiction clearly demonstrated that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply; however, a majority of the 
Justices wrote separately to explicitly affirm why the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine did not bar this suit.75 
These Justices emphasized that in resolving Texaco’s challenge 
to the Texas rules, the Court did not need to decide any issue “either 
actually litigated in the Texas courts or inextricably intertwined with 
issues so litigated.”76 Justice Brennan, the author of the Feldman 
opinion, explained that Texaco filed the federal action only “to 
protect its federal constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity for 
appellate review,” not to challenge the merits of the underlying state 
suit.77 Texaco’s federal action was therefore “separable from and 
collateral to” the merits of the state court judgment.78 
Justice Marshall, however, did not agree with the rest of the 
Court concerning Rooker-Feldman’s applicability.79 In his 
concurrence, he presented the following definition of “inextricably 
intertwined,” which many lower courts subsequently adopted:80 
[I]t is apparent, as a first step, that the federal claim is inextricably 
intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal claim 
succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the 
 
 71. See Smith, supra note 17, at 627 (“This unprecedented damage award [$12 billion], 
Texaco claims, is over forty times larger than the largest private civil judgment ever upheld in 
any prior case of any kind.”). 
 72. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 4–5. 
 73. Id. at 6. 
 74. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny stand for the proposition that 
federal courts may not enjoin pending state court proceedings in certain circumstances. 
 75. These Justices were Scalia, joined by O’Connor; Brennan, joined by Marshall; 
Blackmun; and Stevens, joined by Marshall. 
 76. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. (quoting Nat’l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977)). 
 79. Id. at 23 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 80. See infra Part III.B. 
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issues before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a 
conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive 
the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a 
prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.81 
Marshall opined that Texaco’s request for an injunction necessarily 
involved some review of the merits of its state appeal, so it followed 
from his definition that Texaco’s constitutional claims were 
inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state judgment and 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction.82 
One final case during this time period shed some light on the 
meaning of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Johnson v. De Grandy83 
the Court held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar a Voting Rights Act 
suit by the United States, despite a prior decision by a state supreme 
court, because the United States was not a party to the state suit and 
did not directly attack the state court judgment in the federal action.84 
More illuminating than this, however, is the Court’s description of 
Rooker-Feldman as the doctrine “under which a party losing in state 
court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate 
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based 
on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the 
loser’s federal rights.”85 By indicating that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine might apply only to suits brought by state court losers for 
whom the state court judgment itself is the alleged injury, De Grandy 
suggested that the Court ascribed to a narrow view of the doctrine. 
But not until Exxon Mobil would the Court explicitly clarify its 
perspective on the boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
D. Critiques of the Doctrine 
The majority of commentators on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
sharply criticize it, and many have suggested that it be abandoned 
 
 81. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. at 26. 
 83. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 
 84. Id. at 1006. The Court had already determined that the state proceeding should be 
given no res judicata effect, id. at 1005, so it is unclear which of these three alternative rationales 
was the driving force behind the Court’s decision. A number of lower courts did not interpret 
the Court’s brief conclusory statements in De Grandy to be binding precedent that would 
prevent application of Rooker-Feldman to nonparties. Sherry, supra note 18, at 1112 n.108. 
 85. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1005–06. 
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entirely.86 The critics assert that to the extent that the current 
conception of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine overlaps with existing 
doctrines of preclusion and abstention, it is redundant and 
unnecessary,87 and to the extent that it reaches beyond the preclusion 
and abstention doctrines, it is harmful and even illegitimate.88 Some 
commentators, on the other hand, acknowledge that Rooker-Feldman 
plays a necessary, albeit narrow, role that neither existing preclusion 
nor abstention doctrines fill.89 For example, imagine that a plaintiff 
 
 86. See, e.g., Jack Beermann, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be Our 
Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1233 (1999) (suggesting that “the doctrine should be 
abandoned altogether”); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1174 (“Feldman should be 
overruled, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is going to have to be renamed or abandoned.”); 
Smith, supra, note 17, at 630 (“[O]ne may reasonably reach the conclusion that the Court in 
both Rooker and Feldman was simply wrong . . . .”); Thompson, supra note 31, at 862 (calling 
for an end to recognition of Rooker-Feldman as an independent doctrine of federal court 
jurisdiction). 
 87. See MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, 
AND QUESTIONS 577–79 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that courts and commentators alike are in 
disarray as to what, if anything, Rooker-Feldman adds to the other doctrines: “If Rooker-
Feldman and res judicata are largely co-extensive, does Rooker-Feldman merely elevate res 
judicata from an affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar, making it less subject to the vagaries 
of litigation and the arguments of the parties?”); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1138–
67 (demonstrating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not “do any work” independent of 
that accomplished by existing preclusion and abstention doctrines in federal suits involving 
nonparties to the state suit, state criminal defendants, state civil defendants, state administrative 
defendants, or involuntary state plaintiffs). 
 88. Susan Bandes argues that Rooker-Feldman is neither harmless nor interchangeable 
with doctrines of preclusion or abstention. Instead, she asserts, Rooker-Feldman is inflexible 
and does not contain the exceptions that soften these other doctrines. Bandes, supra note 22, at 
1177–78. As a jurisdictional doctrine, Rooker-Feldman may trump important nonjurisdictional 
policies. Even more troubling, lower courts seem to use the doctrine’s jurisdictional status to 
avoid balancing the doctrine against countervailing doctrines or articulating the rationales 
behind their dispositions. Id. at 1176–78. Professor Beermann, likewise, sees Rooker-Feldman as 
an illegitimate expansion of preclusion rules. Beermann, supra note 86, at 1212. According to 
the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), federal courts are to give prior state 
judgments the same preclusive effect as the state court would—no more and no less. Marrese v. 
Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). Beermann believes that Rooker-
Feldman allows federal courts to give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than 
the state would in some instances “because the characterization of the federal claim as an 
appeal is a matter of federal, not state, law.” Beermann, supra note 86, at 1212. Finally, 
Professors Friedman and Gaylord point out that as far as Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine that fills 
the gaps left by traditional preclusion and abstention doctrines, it is troublesome because the 
exceptions left by existing doctrines “tend to be there for a reason.” Friedman & Gaylord, supra 
note 62, at 1130. 
 89. See Sherry, supra note 18, at 1089–90 (emphasizing that there are undesirable gaps in 
preclusion and abstention doctrines which Rooker-Feldman is necessary to fill); Adam McLain, 
Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1555, 
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brings a federal suit, not seeking to enjoin state proceedings, but 
seeking what is essentially review of a state judgment while state 
appeals are still pending. Younger abstention90 does not apply, and in 
some states interlocutory or appealable orders have no preclusive 
effect.91 Rooker-Feldman would be necessary to prevent the 
inappropriate federal appeal of the state court judgment. An even 
better example is the situation in which a losing state court defendant 
brings a federal suit seeking to rectify harms done by the state suit 
itself. Such a challenge raises claims that do not arise from the same 
transaction as the original state suit; indeed, these claims could not 
have been raised in the state proceedings because the injury did not 
occur until the announcement of the unfavorable state judgment.92 
These new claims would not be barred by res judicata, but federalism 
certainly counsels that federal courts should not entertain these 
challenges to state court decisionmaking; the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine is necessary to protect state courts in these instances.93 
The few scholars who find some value in the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine perhaps have been vindicated by the Exxon Mobil decision, 
in which the Court demonstrated that it still perceived a niche for 
Rooker-Feldman not covered by any other existing doctrine.94 Despite 
the apparent academic consensus that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
might be “worth only the powder to blow it up,”95 the Court in 2005 
reaffirmed that it is here to stay, a holding that counsels lower courts 
and scholars to attempt to learn how to apply the doctrine and its 
central “inextricably intertwined” language correctly. 
 
1557 (2001) (concluding that the scholarly criticisms of Rooker-Feldman are misguided and that 
the doctrine, properly applied, avoids the problems currently associated with it). 
 90. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Sherry, supra note 18, at 1092 & n.35 (taking note of states in which interlocutory 
orders have no preclusive effect). 
 92. Id. at 1093 (raising this hypothetical). 
 93. Federal courts may protect their judgments from state court interference by enjoining 
state suits under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). 
But state courts have no analogous power to protect themselves and their judgments from 
federal court interference. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be understood to promote comity 
as a functional equivalent of the relitigation exception. For further analysis, see McLain, supra 
note 89, at 1582–84. 
 94. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“Rooker-
Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the 
circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to 
state-court actions.”). 
 95. Rowe, supra note 6, at 1081. 
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II.  THE COURT’S RECENT CLARIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
A. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. 
In March 2005, the Supreme Court took the opportunity in 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.96 to rein in the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.97 The parties were engaged in a dispute 
over royalties charged to a joint venture they had formed years 
earlier.98 Saudi Basic sued ExxonMobil in Delaware Superior Court, 
and approximately two weeks later ExxonMobil countersued Saudi 
Basic in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.99 The 
state suit went to trial, with the jury returning a verdict in favor of 
ExxonMobil, and Saudi Basic appealed to the Delaware Supreme 
Court.100 
Before trial, Saudi Basic had moved to dismiss the federal suit, 
alleging immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976.101 The district court denied the motion and Saudi Basic took an 
interlocutory appeal; the Court of Appeals heard arguments in 
December 2003, over eight months after the state court jury verdict.102 
The Court of Appeals raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine sua sponte 
and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction, hypothesizing that if 
Saudi Basic won on appeal in Delaware, ExxonMobil would be 
attempting in the federal action to “invalidate” the state court 
judgment, “the very situation contemplated by Rooker-Feldman’s 
‘inextricably intertwined’ bar.”103 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that federal 
jurisdiction was proper.104 America’s dual system of courts allows for 
 
 96. 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
 97. See id. at 283 (noting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been variously interpreted 
by the lower courts, sometimes “to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman 
cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction 
exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 
28 U. S. C. § 1738”). 
 98. Id. at 289. 
 99. Id. When ExxonMobil later answered Saudi Basic’s state court complaint, it asserted as 
counterclaims the same claims it made in the federal district court. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1611 (2000). 
 102. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 290. At ExxonMobil’s request, the Court of Appeals had 
stayed its consideration of the appeal awaiting resolution of the state trial court proceedings. Id. 
 103. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 104. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 294. 
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parallel state and federal litigation, and Rooker-Feldman does not 
support the notion “that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction 
vanishes” if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related 
question while the federal suit remains under consideration.105 In 
parallel litigation, a federal court may be bound by state preclusion 
law, but preclusion is not a jurisdictional bar.106 The Court held that 
even if a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously 
litigated in state court, if the federal plaintiff presents some 
independent claim, “albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a 
state court has reached in a case to which he was a party,” then the 
federal court has jurisdiction and “state law determines whether the 
defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.”107 The Court 
significantly narrowed the general understanding of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine: 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of 
the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought 
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or 
supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines 
that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference 
to state-court actions.108 
This restatement of the doctrine provides lower courts with 
significant clarifications for employing Rooker-Feldman. 
B. What Exxon Mobil Clarified 
Primary to Exxon Mobil’s definition of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine is the stipulation that it only be used against state court 
losers.109 In this way the Court spelled out for the conflicting circuit 
courts110 that the doctrine does not apply to nonparties to the state 
 
 105. Id. at 292. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 108. Id. at 284. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Compare Skrzypczak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050, 1051 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming, on other 
grounds and without comment to the Rooker-Feldman issue, an unpublished lower court 
decision using Rooker-Feldman to bar a nonparty to the state action from bringing a federal 
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suit. Likewise, the Court made it clear to the divided circuits that the 
alleged federal injury must be caused by the state court judgment 
itself111 and that Rooker-Feldman is not implicated simply because a 
party brings to federal court a matter it previously litigated in state 
court.112 Exxon Mobil demonstrated to the uncertain lower courts that 
the doctrine does not bar parallel litigation,113 and the Court’s 
exposition elucidated the mysterious relationship between Rooker-
Feldman and the preclusion doctrines.114 
C. What Exxon Mobil Did Not Clarify: “Inextricably Intertwined” 
Despite these helpful clarifications, the one issue the Court did 
not explicate in Exxon Mobil was what it means to be inextricably 
intertwined for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Indeed, the 
Court only mentioned the phrase when it described the Feldman 
case115 and the erroneous decision of the Court of Appeals below.116 
The Court’s affirmation of Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” 
 
suit), with United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply Rooker-
Feldman to a nonparty because there is no obligation to intervene to protect one’s rights). 
 111. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. Compare Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 
95 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that Rooker-Feldman bars plaintiff’s federal challenges 
to his employer’s termination procedures), with Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 497 (8th Cir. 
1995) (concluding that the plaintiffs avoid Rooker-Feldman by challenging the action of an 
adverse party rather than the state court’s approval of that action). 
 112. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. Compare Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 196 
(4th Cir. 2002) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts may not consider . . . 
‘issues actually presented to and decided by a state court’” (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 
728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997))), with ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l Corp., 366 F.3d 205, 210–11 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“The ‘actually litigated’ test . . . is potentially misleading in this case because of its close 
relationship to the concepts of claim and issue preclusion.”). 
 113. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292–93. Compare Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 
2005), vacated in part, 413 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
divested the district court of jurisdiction upon the entrance of a judgment by the state court in 
parallel litigation), with Vulcan Chem. Techs., Inc. v. Barker, 297 F.3d 332, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 
2002) (“It would be a novel application of the already beleaguered Rooker-Feldman doctrine to 
divest a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction simply because a parallel case was later filed 
in State court seeking to decide the same question.”). 
 114. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (explaining that preclusion is not a jurisdictional 
matter and is distinct from and subsequent to the Rooker-Feldman inquiry). Compare Vargas v. 
City of N.Y., 377 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is generally 
applied coextensively with principles of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel 
(issue preclusion).”), with Parkview Assocs. P’ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 
2000) (asserting that Rooker-Feldman is not simply a jurisdictional version of preclusion). 
 115. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286. 
 116. Id. at 291. 
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holding117 would seem to indicate continued support for the principle, 
but the Court itself did not use the “inextricably intertwined” concept 
in its analysis of the Exxon Mobil case at all.118 Such avoidance of 
what could be considered the main element of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine119 not only fails to clarify the meaning of the phrase but also 
further confuses the issue by calling into question the concept’s 
continued use.120 
III.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO “INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED” 
Without much guidance from the Supreme Court121 concerning 
the meaning and application of the abstruse “inextricably 
intertwined” concept,122 federal courts have formulated their own 
criteria and rules, resulting in a rather large body of diverse 
standards. These various formulas can be reduced to at least four 
basic approaches, each with some amount of internal diversity and 
almost none with a consistent circuit-wide application. For simplicity 
in examination and critique, this Note characterizes these as the res 
judicata approach, the Marshall approach, the GASH approach, and 
the Noel approach. 
 
 117. Id. at 286 & n.1. 
 118. See id. at 291–94 (analyzing Rooker-Feldman’s application to the case). 
 119. See Rowe, supra note 6, at 1081–82 (defining the “main point” of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine thusly: “that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are 
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the merits of a judgment already rendered by a state court 
system”). 
 120. For analysis of what the Court’s treatment of “inextricably intertwined” in Exxon 
Mobil may mean for the future of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see infra Part V. 
 121. See Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“Since Feldman, the Supreme Court has provided us with little guidance in determining which 
claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior state court judgment and which are not.”). 
 122. See Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“‘[I]nextricably intertwined’ is a somewhat metaphysical concept . . . .”). 
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A. The Res Judicata Approach 
The res judicata123 approach equates “inextricably intertwined” 
with the traditional “could have been raised” standard of 
preclusion.124 Under this approach, a challenge in federal court is 
inextricably intertwined with a previous state court judgment if the 
federal plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in 
the state proceeding, whether the plaintiff actually raised the claim or 
not;125 accordingly, a “claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion.”126 
Courts that use this approach rely on Feldman and its rejection of 
Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas127 for the proposition that a 
plaintiff who fails to raise a challenge in the state court may forfeit 
federal review of that challenge.128 
 
 123. Also known as claim preclusion, res judicata is used here in its narrow sense, referring 
to “the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, 
because of a determination that it should have been advanced in an earlier suit.” Migra v. 
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). Courts that use this approach 
end up with a Rooker-Feldman doctrine that encompasses both claim and issue preclusion, 
however, because they interpret Rooker-Feldman’s general prohibition of appeals as a bar on 
raising issues that have already been litigated (issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel) and its 
“inextricably intertwined” language as barring claims that have not been litigated but should 
have been (claim preclusion, or res judicata). See, e.g., Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 
Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1075 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining how “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
mirrors claim and issue preclusion”). 
 124. See Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB (In re Goetzman), 91 F.3d 1173, 1178 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1996) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine, like the doctrine of preclusion, applies to claims which 
were not brought before the state court but could have been raised in the state court action.”). 
 125. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e view the res 
judicata requirement of full and fair opportunity to litigate, and the Feldman ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ barrier to federal jurisdiction as two sides of the same coin.”); Wood v. Orange 
County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e hold that the Rooker bar can apply only to 
issues that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise.”). 
 126. Moccio, 95 F.3d at 199–200. 
 127. Dasher v. Supreme Court of Tex., 658 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981). The Court in Feldman 
rejected Dasher’s holding that a district court had jurisdiction over direct challenges to a state 
court judgment simply because the particular cause of action that the federal plaintiff brought  
(§ 1983) was not raised in the state proceeding. The Dasher court reasoned that because the 
Supreme Court could not review the § 1983 action because it had not been raised in the state 
court, district court jurisdiction was not an impermissible appeal in violation of Rooker’s 
interpretation of § 1257. In rejecting this argument, the Court introduced the phrase 
“inextricably intertwined.” D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983). 
 128. See, e.g., Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113, 120 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Feldman’s footnote 16 for the proposition that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars issues that 
could have been raised in the state court proceeding”); Wood, 715 F.2d at 1546 (citing 
Feldman’s footnote 16 for the proposition that “the Rooker bar also operates where the plaintiff 
fails to raise his federal claims in state court”). 
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But construing this language as an expansion of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is a misinterpretation of the Court’s discussion in 
Feldman. The Court began by commenting that, according to 
Cardinale v. Louisiana,129 it may not have jurisdiction to review a state 
court decision if a petitioner failed to raise his constitutional claims in 
the state court. After rejecting Dasher’s suggestion that this meant 
that a district court could therefore hear such an appeal even if it 
directly challenged a state court judgment, the Court concluded that 
if a party failed to raise his constitutional challenges in the previous 
state court proceedings, he “may forfeit his right to obtain review of 
the state-court decision in any federal court.”130 Courts that subscribe 
to the res judicata approach interpret this language to mean that 
Rooker-Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” bar prevents any 
federal court from having jurisdiction over any claim that could have 
been raised in the state court proceedings.131 But the Feldman Court 
was simply referring to the limits on its own certiorari jurisdiction.132 
The fact that a constitutional claim was not raised in the state court 
precludes Supreme Court jurisdiction over the state court judgment, 
but it does not prevent the plaintiff from bringing the constitutional 
challenge in a federal district court, unless that challenge is 
inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment itself so that 
the district court is in essence being asked to exercise appellate 
review of the state court decision.133 
Furthermore, the res judicata approach contradicts Feldman’s 
holding134 that a general challenge to the constitutionality of a rule is 
not inextricably intertwined with the state court’s application of that 
rule to a particular plaintiff.135 In holding that the district court had 
 
 129. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969). 
 130. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. 
 131. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16 (discussing in the context of “the requirement that 
constitutional claims be raised in state court as a predicate to our certiorari jurisdiction”). 
 133. See id. at 483–84 n.16 (“If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district 
court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision], then the district court is in 
essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.”). For a different take on the 
interplay between “could have been raised” and “inextricably intertwined” in Feldman that 
reaches the same conclusion, see Smith, supra note 17, at 646–47. 
 134. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487 (holding that the general attack on the constitutionality of 
the rule was not barred by Rooker-Feldman). 
 135. See Parkview Assocs. P’ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Such 
a reading [that Rooker-Feldman precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over all claims that 
could have been raised in a previous state court proceeding] would be inconsistent with the 
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jurisdiction over the general attacks, the Court expressly did not 
reach “the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata 
foreclose[d] litigation” of those claims,136 an explicit indication that 
the Court differentiated between res judicata and “inextricably 
intertwined.”137 Certainly the general attacks in Feldman could have 
been raised in the state court, but this did not prevent the Court from 
allowing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over those claims.138 
Confusing res judicata with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s 
“inextricably intertwined” element is understandable insofar as both 
doctrines “define the respect one court owes to an earlier 
judgment.”139 But the two are founded on different principles: res 
judicata rests on the Full Faith and Credit Statute,140 which requires 
federal courts to give a judgment the same effect as the rendering 
state would,141 whereas the Rooker-Feldman doctrine rests on the 
principle that district courts only have original jurisdiction.142 Rooker-
Feldman is a jurisdictional bar, whereas res judicata determines which 
party prevails after the court has assumed jurisdiction over the suit.143 
 
Court’s other holding in Feldman that the district court did have jurisdiction over the general 
challenge to the constitutionality of the rule.”). 
 136. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487–88. 
 137. See Parkview Assocs. P’Ship, 225 F.3d at 329 (“In Feldman, the Supreme Court sub 
silentio acknowledged the difference between the doctrines when, after directing remand of the 
plaintiffs’ general constitutional challenges, it expressly refrained from considering res judicata, 
leaving that question to the district court.”). 
 138. See Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that if a constitutional 
claim is inextricably intertwined merely because it could have been raised in the earlier state 
proceeding, “the Court would not have allowed the litigants in Feldman to bring their general 
constitutional challenges to the bar admission rule in federal district court”). The Court’s 
treatment of Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1987), indicating that Rooker-
Feldman did not bar a district court from exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge 
that could have been brought in the state court proceedings, further buttresses this conclusion. 
See Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754. 
 139. GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993). Indeed, ever 
since Rooker was decided, courts have conflated its jurisdictional principle with preclusion. See 
Thompson, supra note 31, at 866 & n.27 (citing cases in which Rooker was used as a principle of 
res judicata, not a doctrine of federal jurisdiction). 
 140. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). 
 141. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). 
 142. See supra Part II. 
 143. See GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 728 (emphasizing that the jurisdictional question 
precedes the determination of whether the defendant prevails under preclusion principles); 
Sherry, supra note 18, at 1101–02 (“Rooker-Feldman . . . tell[s] federal courts when they may 
review state court decisions; preclusion rules tell them how to treat those decisions. The former 
issue sounds purely in federalism, while the latter can arise in any context, including between 
states.”). 
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Conflating “inextricably intertwined” with preclusion elevates res 
judicata from an affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar144 and 
results in an entirely redundant Rooker-Feldman doctrine that has no 
independent meaning of its own.145 Moreover, because preclusion is 
governed by state law, such an approach allows state law to determine 
the contours of federal jurisdiction and govern a doctrine based 
entirely on federal law.146 This interpretation of “inextricably 
intertwined” is a blunt instrument and reaches far beyond the 
circumstances of the Rooker and Feldman cases, often denying 
plaintiffs their choice of forum,147 or worse, denying them a chance to 
bring their action (which does not seek to overturn the state court 
judgment) at all. Taken to its logical end, this approach makes the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine superfluous and abrogates our dual system 
of courts. 
B. The Marshall Approach 
The Marshall approach generally finds a claim to be inextricably 
intertwined with a previous state court judgment if, for the plaintiff to 
prevail, the district court must make a determination that indicates 
that the state court was wrong about some matter.148 This approach is 
 
 144. By essentially giving res judicata jurisdictional status, this approach prevents courts 
from considering the nuances of preclusion and of the case at hand, which litigation might bring 
to the fore. See REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 87, at 578 (suggesting that if res judicata 
becomes a jurisdictional bar it is less subject to “the vagaries of litigation and the arguments of 
the parties”). 
 145. This interpretation is the source of many of the problems critics find with the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1129 (criticizing Rooker-
Feldman to the extent that it does not seem to add anything not already supplied by preclusion 
doctrine); Thompson, supra note 31, at 911 (concluding that any possible difference between 
Rooker-Feldman and preclusion is purely academic). 
 146. See Vargas v. City of N.Y., 377 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (using New York’s 
preclusion rules to determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction over the federal 
plaintiff’s claim); Randolph v. Lipscher, 641 F. Supp. 767, 775 (D.N.J. 1986) (using New Jersey 
res judicata law to determine if Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiff’s federal constitutional 
claim); cf. Kenman Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 479 (10th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing 
between res judicata, which is based largely on state common law, and Rooker-Feldman, which 
is concerned with federalism and based squarely on federal law). 
 147. See Bandes, supra note 22, at 1176 (discussing the significant amount of forum shifting 
created by such a broad understanding of Rooker-Feldman). 
 148. See Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that a federal claim is 
inextricably intertwined if “federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state 
court was wrong” (quoting Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 
2003))); ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l Corp., 366 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2004) (“If the relief 
requested in the federal action requires determining that the state court’s decision is wrong or 
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reflected in Justice Marshall’s Pennzoil concurrence: “[I]t is apparent, 
as a first step, that the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with 
the state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the 
extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.”149 
With so little clear guidance from the Supreme Court concerning 
“inextricably intertwined,” many lower courts have embraced this 
lucid definition from Justice Marshall.150 
This approach, however, can lead courts to some absurd 
conclusions. For example, in Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.,151 
the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ malpractice claims152 
against their former attorney were inextricably intertwined with the 
state court’s approval of a settlement between the attorney and an 
adverse party and were therefore barred.153 In the state court 
proceedings, the plaintiffs were out-of-state members of a class that 
brought a suit against the bank.154 The state court approved a 
proposed settlement between the class and the bank, including 
attorney’s fees.155 But because the attorney sought his fees out of each 
individual’s refund from the settlement rather than directly from the 
bank’s funds, some class members, including the Kamilewiczs, 
suffered a net loss despite the settlement.156 When the plaintiffs 
 
would void the state court’s ruling, then the issues are inextricably intertwined . . . .” (quoting 
FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996))); Safety-
Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 858 (4th Cir. 2001) (“A federal claim is ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ with a state court decision if ‘success on the federal claim depends upon a 
determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’” (quoting Plyler v. 
Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997))); Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 
1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in 
order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues presented to both courts are inextricably 
intertwined.”); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (“A claim is 
inextricably intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court 
wrongly decided the issues before it.”). 
 149. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 150. See Sherry, supra note 18, at 1097 (calling Marshall’s definition the “most useful—and 
most frequently quoted”). 
 151. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 152. The plaintiffs brought numerous claims, including those against their former attorney, 
against the Bank (the opposing party in the underlying state litigation), and against the Bank’s 
lawyers. Id. at 509. The claims that are pertinent here are the claims against their attorney for 
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. 
 153. Id. at 511. 
 154. Id. at 508. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 508–09. To be specific, Kamilewicz recovered $2.19 in the settlement and was 
charged $91.33 in attorney’s fees. Id. at 508. 
06__JONES.DOC 12/19/2006  5:11 PM 
666 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:643 
brought a malpractice suit against the attorney, the court held that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction.157 
The circuit court, concerned that allowing the plaintiffs to seek 
recompense from the class attorney would force the district court to 
“run directly into the state court finding . . . that the fees were 
reasonable,” concluded that the suit was inextricably intertwined with 
the state court judgment.158 If the plaintiffs prevailed against their 
former attorney in federal court, that outcome would indicate that the 
state court was wrong in finding that the settlement, including 
attorney’s fees, was fair and reasonable. According to the Marshall 
approach, then, the malpractice suit was inextricably intertwined with 
the state court decision. 
But clearly the plaintiffs were not, in their malpractice suit, 
seeking to overturn the state court judgment. Their suit could in no 
way be styled as an appeal of the state court decision; therefore, it did 
not implicate the rationale behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The 
entitlements of the adverse state court parties vis-à-vis each other 
were fixed by the judgment, and the plaintiffs did not seek to change 
those.159 Instead, they asserted that they suffered independent harms 
due to their attorney’s breach of loyalty and care, which were 
concealed both from the class and from the state judge.160 But because 
a holding for the plaintiffs in federal court would depend on finding 
that the state court was wrong about the reasonableness of the 
attorney’s fees, the suit was barred.161 
The Kamilewicz holding suggests that the Marshall approach is 
too broad a definition of “inextricably intertwined,” a suggestion that 
is confirmed by Pennzoil. Justice Marshall was the only Justice who 
was of the opinion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Texaco’s 
federal suit—five Justices162 explicitly rejected the application of 
 
 157. Id. at 510. 
 158. Id. at 511. 
 159. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing). 
 160. Id. at 1352. 
 161. Judge Easterbrook’s approach is more harmonious with the rationales behinds the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1353 (“Were [plaintiff] merely claiming that the decision of 
the state court was incorrect, even that it denied him some constitutional right, the doctrine 
would indeed bar his claim. But if he claims, as he does, that people involved in the decision 
violated some independent right of his . . . then he can, without being blocked by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, sue to vindicate that right.” (quoting Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1004 
(7th Cir. 1995))). 
 162. Justices Scalia, O’Connor, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. 
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Rooker-Feldman and the remaining three163 did so sub silentio by 
joining the majority opinion, which assumed jurisdiction was 
proper.164 Marshall appears to have been correct in asserting that the 
federal court had to conduct some inquiry into the merits of the state 
appeal in order to make the requisite determinations of irreparable 
injury and likelihood of success of the merits.165 But unlike Marshall, 
the other Justices, most notably Justice Brennan,166 did not find that 
this made the federal claims inextricably intertwined with the state 
court judgment. Brennan, the author of Feldman, opined that because 
Texaco did not file its federal suit to challenge the merits of the state 
court decision, its pursuit of a stay of judgment pending appeal was 
“‘separable from and collateral to’ the merits of the state court 
judgment.”167 Marshall’s broad approach would have prevented 
Texaco, on Rooker-Feldman grounds, from being able to bring a 
challenge in federal court that was not seeking an appeal of or even 
implicated by the merits of the state court judgment. 
Inconsistent with Pennzoil itself, the Marshall approach can be 
used to bar actions that, although possibly requiring inquiry into state 
court issues, do not seek to upset a state court judgment. The 
Marshall approach to “inextricably intertwined” seems to have at its 
core a healthy interest in protecting state court judgments and 
promoting comity; however, it covers too broad a spectrum of claims, 
resulting in undesirable outcomes such as Kamilewicz. The 
overbreadth of this approach prevents these and other worthy 
plaintiffs from bringing their independent challenges in federal court. 
C. The GASH Approach 
A third approach to “inextricably intertwined” currently in use 
among lower federal courts is the GASH approach,168 which focuses 
on the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff.169 According to this 
 
 163. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and White. 
 164. See Thompson, supra note 31, at 888–89 (dissecting the Rooker-Feldman opinions in 
Pennzoil). 
 165. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 26 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 166. Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 167. Id. (quoting Nat’l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977)). 
 168. The approach is so labeled here because one of the most frequently cited articulations 
of this approach is in GASH Associates v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 169. See Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In order to determine the 
applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate question to ask 
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approach, the “inextricably intertwined” determination “hinges on 
whether the federal claim alleges that the injury was caused by the 
state court judgment, or, alternatively, whether the federal claim 
alleges an independent prior injury that the state court failed to 
remedy.”170 If the federal claim alleges an injury that was caused by 
the state court judgment, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 
jurisdiction over that inextricably intertwined claim, whether it was 
argued in the state court or not.171 When a plaintiff suffers an injury 
out of court and then fails to get relief from the state court, a 
subsequent federal suit is not inextricably intertwined; only if the 
plaintiff complains of an injury which was caused by the state court 
judgment would Rooker-Feldman prohibit federal jurisdiction.172 
Under this approach, if a plaintiff is not seeking to set aside the state 
court judgment but rather presents “some independent claim, albeit 
one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a 
case to which he was a party,” then the federal court has 
jurisdiction.173 
This approach interprets the rationale behind the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine primarily to be the prevention of collateral attacks 
on state court judgments.174 The Rooker and Feldman cases are about 
the inappropriateness of district courts entertaining state court 
appeals, so this approach declines to extend the “inextricably 
intertwined” inquiry beyond asking if the “district court is in essence 
being called upon to review the state-court decision.”175 This method 
is also in accord with the Supreme Court’s indications of its post-
Feldman (and therefore after the addition of “inextricably 
 
is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself 
or is distinct from that judgment.”). 
 170. Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 171. See Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that Rooker-Feldman’s bar against federal jurisdiction when a plaintiff alleges an injury caused 
by a state court judgment reaches to inextricably intertwined claims even if those claims were 
not argued in the state court). 
 172. See GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 729 (holding GASH’s claim barred because its injury 
came from the state court judgment—it did not “suffer an injury out of court and then fail to get 
relief from state court”). 
 173. Id. at 728. 
 174. See id. at 727 (“Litigants cannot file collateral attacks on civil judgments; instead they 
must seek review in the Supreme Court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine creates a jurisdictional 
obstacle to collateral review, one we must respect even if the parties do not present the issue for 
decision.”). 
 175. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983). 
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instead asks whether the state court judgment both actually and 
proximately caused the injury for which the federal plaintiff seeks 
redress.181 As in Pennzoil, if the plaintiff would not have standing to 
pursue his federal challenge aside from the adverse state court 
judgment, this fact alone does not make his federal claim inextricably 
intertwined with the state court judgment.182 Only if the state court 
judgment is both the actual and proximate cause of his alleged injury 
is the plaintiff’s federal claim barred. 
Although there are some internal variations among courts that 
use the GASH approach,183 they agree that the rationale behind the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine only supports a definition of “inextricably 
intertwined” that hinges on whether the federal claim alleges an 
injury caused by the state court judgment.184 This approach is 
significantly narrower than the previous two, more common, 
approaches, and for that reason it may be more appealing to critics of 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.185 
 
rule. And this is precisely the case with Richardson—if the state court had decided not to 
suspend him, he would not have standing to challenge the suspension rules. 
 181. Kenman Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 182. In the GASH opinion itself, Judge Easterbrook supports a previous Seventh Circuit 
decision finding that if the adverse state court judgment was the only reason the plaintiff had 
standing to bring the independent challenge then the independent claim was inextricably 
intertwined and was outside federal jurisdiction. See GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 
F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) (supporting Leaf v. Supreme Court of Wis., 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 
1992)). For a demonstration of why this approach is inconsistent with Feldman, see supra note 
180. 
 183. In addition to differing opinions regarding the federal plaintiff’s standing, some courts 
that subscribe to the GASH approach disagree on whether they should add a “full and fair 
opportunity to litigate” requirement to the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry. Compare, e.g., 
Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Once we have 
determined that a claim is inextricably intertwined, i.e., that it indirectly seeks to set aside a 
state court judgment, we must then determine whether ‘the plaintiff did not have a reasonable 
opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings.’” (quoting Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 
660, 668 (7th Cir. 2002))), with Kenman Eng’g, 314 F.3d at 478–79 (rejecting the full and fair 
opportunity to litigate inquiry because “[i]njecting the full-and-fair-opportunity-to-litigate 
inquiry into the Rooker-Feldman [sic] analysis tends to blur the distinction between res judicata 
and Rooker-Feldman”). 
 184. See Cory v. Fahlstrom, 143 Fed. App’x 84, 87 (10th Cir. 2005) (“This is a claim that [the 
plaintiff] was injured by the state court judgment, which is precisely the type of claim prohibited 
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”). 
 185. For example, Jack Beermann has argued that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should 
have no application “when the complaint in federal court is about conduct outside of the state 
court, because it is inaccurate to characterize such a claim as an appeal from the state court’s 
judgment. It may be an attempt to relitigate, but it is not an appeal.” Beermann, supra note 86, 
at 1214. 
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D. The Noel Approach 
The most recently developed approach to the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine’s “inextricably intertwined” language is that articulated by 
the Ninth Circuit in Noel v. Hall.186 The Noel approach has two steps: 
First, the court determines if the federal plaintiff is seeking to bring a 
“forbidden de facto appeal” of the state court judgment.187 Then, and 
only then, the court considers if the plaintiff is seeking to litigate an 
issue that is inextricably intertwined with the state court judicial 
decision from which the forbidden appeal is brought.188 “Only when 
there is already a forbidden de facto appeal in federal court does the 
‘inextricably intertwined’ test come into play.”189 The Noel court 
emphasized that a federal suit “is not a forbidden de facto appeal 
because it is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with something.”190 That is, 
federal suits should not be dismissed based on Feldman’s 
“inextricably intertwined” standard alone—if the court does not first 
determine that the suit seeks an impermissible appeal of the state 
court judgment, none of the issues the suit raises can be considered 
inextricably intertwined.191 
The majority of the Noel court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis thus 
focuses on whether the plaintiff seeks a forbidden de facto appeal, 
which the court finds to occur “when the plaintiff in federal district 
court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state 
court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”192 In 
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.193 the Ninth Circuit found that, although the 
plaintiff sought relief from the state court judgment, she did not 
complain of a legal wrong committed by the state court.194 Instead, she 
alleged that wrongful acts of the defendants were responsible for the 
court’s erroneous judgment.195 Because her complaint only satisfied 
one prong of the “forbidden de facto appeal” test, the court held that 
 
 186. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 187. Id. at 1158. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“Under Noel, claims are dismissed as ‘inextricably intertwined’ only when an improper 
appeal under Rooker-Feldman is already before the district court.”). 
 192. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. 
 193. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 194. Id. at 1139. 
 195. Id. 
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Kougasian was not seeking a forbidden appeal and therefore it had 
no occasion to inquire into whether any of her claims were 
inextricably intertwined with issues before the state court.196 Although 
in “an ordinary language sense, the issues in Kougasian’s claims 
[were] indeed ‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues in [the state court 
proceedings],”197 the court held that “[b]ecause she is not bringing a 
forbidden de facto appeal, there are no issues with which the issues in 
her federal claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ within the meaning of 
Rooker-Feldman.”198 
This approach shifts “inextricably intertwined” to the back 
burner of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine based on a close reading of 
the Feldman case, in which the phrase was introduced. In Feldman, 
the Court first determined that the plaintiffs were seeking 
impermissible appellate review of the state court decision; it then held 
that those Fifth Amendment claims that were inextricably intertwined 
with the impermissible appeal were also barred, but those Fifth 
Amendment claims that related to the general challenge (which was 
not an impermissible appeal) were not inextricably intertwined with 
an impermissible appeal and therefore not barred.199 The “inextricably 
intertwined” limitation only served to prevent Feldman “from raising, 
in the non-appeal part of his suit, issues that he was prevented from 
litigating in his forbidden de facto appeal.”200 The Noel court’s 
reluctance to dismiss actions for being inextricably intertwined was 
heightened by the Supreme Court’s caution in employing the 
doctrine.201 Furthermore, the court found preserving the possibility for 
simultaneous litigation and not overstepping the bounds of preclusion 
to be important reasons for hedging in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
in this way.202 
 
 196. Id. at 1143. 
 197. Id. at 1142. 
 198. Id. at 1143; see also Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
“inextricably intertwined” does not come into play because the federal plaintiff is not alleging a 
legal wrong of an erroneous state court decision). 
 199. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing the Feldman court’s 
use of “inextricably intertwined”). 
 200. Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142. 
 201. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158–59 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court has not used the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to deny jurisdiction in any case other than those two). 
 202. See id. at 1159 (encouraging caution “in light of two well-established rules that would 
be in tension with an overly broad reading of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . first, the rule 
that overlapping or even identical federal and state court litigation may proceed simultaneously, 
limited only by doctrines of abstention and comity; and, second, the rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 
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Perhaps because of its relative youth, the Noel approach has not 
been substantively critiqued by courts that employ other approaches, 
but the Ninth Circuit itself has compared its method to those of other 
circuits. The court has correctly observed that the res judicata 
approach is much broader than this approach, effectively barring any 
claim that is inextricably intertwined, in the ordinary language 
sense,203 with issues already decided in the state court.204 Similarly, the 
Marshall approach is also more expansive than the Noel approach.205 
The court has noted that the GASH approach presents a “similar 
formulation” of the injury requirement,206 although the Noel approach 
seems to be more restrictive in its use of the “inextricably 
intertwined” concept. 
The Noel approach seriously constrains not only the 
“inextricably intertwined” inquiry but also the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine as a whole. To the extent that this approach cuts away much 
of the overlap with and intrusion upon the doctrines of preclusion and 
abstention, those who criticize the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for not 
“doing any work”207 may be attracted to this approach. However, the 
emphasis this approach places on the relief the federal plaintiff seeks 
and the formal structure of the approach’s stages may make it 
possible for plaintiffs to pass the requirements and get into federal 
 
under which a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment” as 
the courts of that state would give to that judgment). 
 203. The court distinguishes between the “ordinary language sense” of inextricably 
intertwined and its “narrow and specialized meaning in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” 
Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142. 
 204. See id. at 1142–43 (distinguishing the Noel approach from one that equates 
“inextricably intertwined” with principles of preclusion). 
 205. For example, imagine a federal plaintiff who brings a due process challenge to the 
revocation of a medical license without challenging the state court judgment that affirmed the 
license revocation on the merits. According to the Marshall approach, see supra Part III.B, if the 
federal plaintiff succeeded in the due process challenge, it would indicate that the state court 
was wrong about the appropriateness of the revocation; therefore, the challenge is inextricably 
intertwined with the state court judgment and must be dismissed. But according to the Noel 
approach, the federal plaintiff does not both complain of a legal wrong allegedly committed by 
the state court and seek relief from the judgment of that court; therefore, the plaintiff advances 
no forbidden appeal with which the claim could be inextricably intertwined, and the federal 
court has jurisdiction. See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142 (distinguishing the Noel approach from a 
case in which a due process challenge to revocation of a medical license was dismissed as 
“inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment affirming revocation of the license on the 
merits” (citing Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 206. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. 
 207. See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 62, at 1132 (finding that Rooker-Feldman does 
little work independent of preclusion and abstention doctrines). 
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court yet run afoul of the spirit and purpose of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine. It remains to be seen if the Noel approach may be too 
narrow to properly respect and protect state courts. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF EXXON MOBIL FOR  
“INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED” 
Having surveyed the approaches the circuit courts have taken 
toward the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s “inextricably intertwined” 
language, what guidance can be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s 
Exxon Mobil decision? Recall that in Exxon Mobil the Court 
restricted Rooker-Feldman to the narrow ground208 of the Rooker and 
Feldman cases, both of which involved federal plaintiffs calling upon 
district courts to “overturn an injurious state-court judgment.”209 The 
unanimous Court specified four requirements for invocation of the 
doctrine: 1) the case must be brought by a state court loser; 2) the 
injury alleged must be caused by the state court judgment; 3) the 
judgment must have been rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced; and 4) the case must invite district court 
review and rejection of that judgment.210 
Finding that Exxon Mobil did not satisfy all four aspects of this 
exposition and therefore escaped application of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, the Court did not have occasion to consider whether 
ExxonMobil’s claims were inextricably intertwined.211 The Court did 
mention “inextricably intertwined” in its account of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine212 and did not repudiate the concept, indicating that 
it is still a part of the doctrine. But by not using the concept in its 
analysis of the case, the Court seemed to show that a determination 
as to whether a claim is inextricably intertwined or not is not essential 
to every Rooker-Feldman inquiry. It could be that by leaving 
“inextricably intertwined” out of its distilled definition of the Rooker-
 
 208. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“In the 
case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit misperceived the narrow ground 
occupied by Rooker-Feldman.”). 
 209. Id. at 292. 
 210. Id. at 284; see also Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 
2005) (dividing Exxon Mobil’s four requirements into two substantive components and two 
procedural components). 
 211. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293–94 (finding that ExxonMobil filed the federal action 
before judgment was rendered in the state court and that ExxonMobil was the winner in the 
state court proceedings). 
 212. Id. at 286 n.1. 
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Feldman doctrine and not using it in its analysis in Exxon Mobil the 
Court was indicating that the concept has no independent meaning 
and instead simply states a conclusion.213 However, it is also possible 
that, because this case dealt primarily with and was resolved on the 
issues of timing and parallel litigation, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
was never triggered,214 and thus, there was no need to inquire into the 
substance and possible intertwinement of ExxonMobil’s claims.215 
So what does Exxon Mobil mean for the four approaches to 
“inextricably intertwined” examined in this Note? It is clear that the 
res judicata approach is no longer a viable option. The Court 
explicitly differentiated between preclusion, which is not a 
jurisdictional matter,216 and Rooker-Feldman, which “does not 
otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine,”217 even citing a 
Second Circuit case that equated res judicata with “inextricably 
intertwined” as an example of an interpretation that extends the 
doctrine “far beyond” its proper contours.218 Courts that had been 
using a res judicata approach have already begun to notice that their 
understanding of the doctrine must be “substantially altered,”219 
recognizing that after Exxon Mobil their inquiry can no longer be 
whether an issue was or could have been litigated in the state court,220 
but rather should be whether the federal plaintiff alleges an injury 
due to the state court judgment itself.221 To make this point crystal 
 
 213. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87 (“[T]he phrase ‘inextricably intertwined’ has no 
independent content. It is simply a descriptive label attached to claims that meet the 
requirements outlined in Exxon Mobil.”). 
 214. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 (“When there is parallel state and federal litigation, 
Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the entry of judgment in state court.”). 
 215. Indeed, the Court never looked into or even listed what claims ExxonMobil brought in 
the federal court, except to say they were the same as its state court counterclaims. See id. at 289 
(ExxonMobil answered Saudi Basic’s state court complaint by asserting counterclaims that were 
the same as those claims it made in the federal suit). 
 216. See id. at 293 (“Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter.”). 
 217. Id. at 284. 
 218. See id. at 283 (citing Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199–200 
(2d Cir. 1996), as an example of an overbroad interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 
 219. Federacion de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 
17, 19 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 220. See Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing 
between res judicata and Rooker-Feldman and citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292, for the 
proposition that the question for Rooker-Feldman purposes is not simply whether an issue has 
been litigated in state court). 
 221. See Mercury v. S. Liberty Realty Corp. (In re Mercury), 153 Fed. App’x 756, 757 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (noting that after Exxon Mobil, Rooker-Feldman applies only “if the federal suit is 
brought to remedy an injury whose source is the state-court judgment itself”). 
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clear, the Court issued a per curiam opinion less than a year after 
Exxon Mobil, explicitly stating that “Rooker-Feldman is not simply 
preclusion by another name.”222 
Although some courts are still using Marshall-esque language 
alongside the Exxon Mobil formulation of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine,223 the Marshall approach to “inextricably intertwined” does 
not appear to survive Exxon Mobil any better than the res judicata 
approach. The Court, quoting GASH, held that, as long as a plaintiff 
presents some independent claim, “albeit one that denies a legal 
conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a 
party,” the federal court has jurisdiction.224 Contrary to the Marshall 
approach, the Exxon Mobil Court would allow a federal court to 
entertain a suit in which success for the plaintiff would deny a legal 
conclusion reached by the state court. Exxon Mobil’s requirement of 
“review and rejection”225 of a state court judgment further indicates 
that the Marshall approach to “inextricably intertwined” 
inappropriately bars independent challenges from federal court.226 
 
 222. Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1202 (2006) (per curiam). In this case, the plaintiffs 
were not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding, but the district court determined that 
they were in privity with the state-court plaintiff according to preclusion law and thus their 
federal suit should be barred by Rooker-Feldman. The Court admonished the district court for 
“erroneously conflat[ing] preclusion law with Rooker-Feldman. . . . The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, 
for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the 
judgment.” Id. In so holding, the Court agreed with the doctrine’s critics that “[i]ncorporation of 
preclusion principles into Rooker-Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform 
federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith 
and Credit Act.” Id. at 1202–03. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Johnson v. Ohio Sup. Ct., 156 Fed. App’x 779, 782 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Marshall’s definition from Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., 
concurring), alongside the footnote in Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286 n.1, on inextricably 
intertwined); Indus. Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Monroe County, 134 Fed. App’x 314, 317 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil’s definition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Exxon Mobil, 
544 U.S. at 292, alongside a circuit case saying federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits in which 
“‘the relief requested . . . requires determining that the state court’s decision is wrong’” (quoting 
Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003))); Chajkowski v. 
Bosick, 132 Fed. App’x 978, 979 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining a federal claim as “inextricably 
intertwined” if it “succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues 
before it” (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d 
Cir., 1996))). 
 224. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 
726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 225. Id. at 284, 291. 
 226. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Welch, No. 1:05-cv-0467-DFH-TAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15451, at *8 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2005) (“The language of ‘review and rejection’ in Exxon Mobil 
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Perhaps, then, the Exxon Mobil decision affirms the Noel 
approach: because the Court did not find ExxonMobil to be seeking 
an impermissible appeal of a state court judgment, it did not move on 
to the second step to consider whether any of ExxonMobil’s claims 
might be inextricably intertwined with the judgment from which 
appeal was sought. Perhaps, like the Noel court, the Exxon Mobil 
Court was focusing on the relief sought, as opposed to the issues 
raised, by the federal plaintiff.227 The Noel approach is certainly still 
viable, even strengthened, after Exxon Mobil;228 but although the 
Court did not inquire into the issues ExxonMobil raised, it did not 
focus on the relief ExxonMobil sought either. One comes away from 
Exxon Mobil with the sense that it is a procedural, rather than 
substantive, decision—in applying Rooker-Feldman to the facts of the 
case, the Court focused almost entirely on the fact of the parallel 
litigation.229 So, although the bases of the Noel approach are 
confirmed by the Exxon Mobil decision, it is a stretch to say that the 
Court embraced its detailed approach.230 The lower court in Exxon 
 
shows that a mere reading of a state court decision to determine its contents will not be 
sufficient to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284)). 
 227. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 133.30[3][c][iii] (predicting one possible 
interpretation of “inextricably intertwined” after Exxon Mobil to be that “it is relevant only if at 
least one claim in a federal suit asserts an injury caused by a prior state-court judgment and 
seeks review and rejection of that judgment,” an interpretation they found “consistent with that 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit” in Noel). 
 228. See Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1029–30 & n.9 
(9th Cir. 2005) (noting that in Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court affirmed the substance of 
Noel’s formulation of Rooker-Feldman as violated when a plaintiff seeks relief from a state 
court judgment by asserting as his injury a legal wrong in the judgment itself). 
 229. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293–94 (discussing the relation between Rooker-Feldman 
and parallel litigation, and deciding the case based on the fact that “Rooker-Feldman did not 
prevent the District Court from exercising jurisdiction when ExxonMobil filed the federal 
action, and it did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction after ExxonMobil prevailed in the 
Delaware courts”); see also Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2005) (observing 
that determining whether state court proceedings were complete is the first step of a post-Exxon 
Mobil Rooker-Feldman analysis). 
 230. But see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” 
Explicable at Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 
2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 13 (May 2006), http://fclr.org/2006fedctslrev1.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 
2006) (advancing the Noel approach and finding it “consistent with Exxon Mobil”). This article, 
published in the interim between the creation and publication of this Note, suggests that 
although Exxon Mobil does not endorse or logically mandate the Noel approach, it is 
“consistent with the Exxon Mobil Court’s reading of Feldman and its overall analytical 
approach.” Id. at 16. Rowe and Baskauskas confirm the conclusions of this Note, however, 
when they assert that “the ‘inextricably intertwined’ formulation, although not expressly 
repudiated or limited, appears to have been relegated to—at most—some secondary role and in 
any event no longer to be a general or threshold test.” Id. at 3–4. 
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Mobil based its decision on the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry,231 
so if the Supreme Court sought to introduce the circuits to a 
structured approach in which “inextricably intertwined” is only 
considered after it is determined on the basis of another claim that 
Rooker-Feldman applies, this was the case in which to do it. But 
instead the Court only briefly mentioned “inextricably intertwined” 
and its connection with the doctrine, giving no indication that it 
envisioned a bifurcated approach to the concept. 
The GASH approach, then, which is quite similar to but less 
structured than Noel, may be most in line with the Court’s indications 
in Exxon Mobil. The Exxon Mobil formulation of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine centers on the key requirement that the federal 
plaintiff alleges an injury caused by the state court judgment,232 which 
is the heart of the GASH approach to “inextricably intertwined.” In 
addition, the Court quoted the analysis from GASH with approval in 
its analysis and disposition of Exxon Mobil, noting that Noel was in 
agreement with the quoted passage.233 
CONCLUSION 
Looking ahead to future invocations of Rooker-Feldman’s 
“inextricably intertwined” concept, lower courts would be well 
advised to follow the lead of the GASH court and its progeny. In 
Exxon Mobil the Court dramatically narrowed the common 
understanding of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a whole, an 
indication that it envisions a more narrow use of “inextricably 
intertwined.” An approach that employs “inextricably intertwined” 
not as an alternative bar to jurisdiction independent from the central 
Rooker-Feldman analysis, but rather as a partner with such analysis 
and subject to the Exxon Mobil requirements, will not run afoul of 
 
 231. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. 
 232. See id. at 284, 291–92 (confining Rooker-Feldman to cases in which the state court 
judgment caused the alleged injury, as in the Rooker and Feldman cases); see also Mercury v. S. 
Liberty Realty Corp. (In re Mercury), 153 Fed. App’x 756, 757 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
after Exxon Mobil, “Rooker-Feldman applies only if the federal suit is brought to remedy an 
injury whose source is the state-court judgment itself”); Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of 
Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005) (The key to Rooker-Feldman lies in Exxon Mobil’s 
“second substantive requirement: that federal plaintiffs are not subject to the Rooker-Feldman 
bar unless they complain of an injury caused by a state judgment. Indeed, this is the core 
requirement from which the others derive; focusing on it helps clarify when the doctrine 
applies”). 
 233. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. 
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the Court’s pronouncements on the doctrine thus far. However, 
courts should now be careful not to go to the opposite extreme of 
creating too narrow a role for “inextricably intertwined” in their 
analysis, thereby obliterating Feldman’s expansion of the doctrine. 
Although Exxon Mobil cut away at much of Rooker-Feldman’s 
ground cover, it left the doctrine’s federalist roots intact. 
